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Goodwill-Partership-Sale-Whal passes-Firmname-Right to use.
i. The goodwill of a partnership is a part of the pfoperty of the firm;
and when, on a dissolution of the partnership, one of the partners
transfers to the others all his interest in the firm business and assets, with
the understanding that they are to succeed to the business of the old firm,
such sale carries with it the vendor's interest in the goodwill.
2. The firm name is part of this goodwill, and the right to use it accordingly passes to the purchasing partners; and when the contract of sale
reserves to the retiring partner no right with respect to that name, he
cannot lawfully use it in a business of a like kind, carried on by him in
the vicinity subsequent to such dissolution.
3. In a proper case a court of equity will perpetually enjoin such
unlawful use of the firm name by the retiring partner.
GOODWILL AS PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.

I. Its nature and incidents.(a). According to Lord Eldon, in
Cruttwell v. Lye. 17 Ves. 335, it is
"nothing more than the probability
that the old customers will resort
to the old place."
Moreau zr.
Edwards, 2 Tenn. Ch. 347. Others
have defined it as "the chance or
probability that custom will be had
at a certain place of business in
consequence of the way in which
that business has been previously
carried on:" England v. Downs, 6
Beav. 269. The probability that
'Reported in 33 N. E. Rep. 88.

the business will continue in"the
future as in the past: Bell v. Ellis,
33 Cal. 62o. Every possible advantage acquired by the firm in carrying on its business, whether connected with the premises or the
name, or other matters: Ginesi v.
Cooper, 14 Ch. D. 596; Farwell v.
Huling, 132 Ill. UI2; and see.Fay
v. Pay (N. J.), 6 Atl. Rep. 12. The
favor which the management of a
business wins from the public, and
the probability that old customers
will continue their patronage : Chit-
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tenden z. Witbeck, 50 Mich. 4O ; that the goodwill of a business is
the right to succeed to it, or to
S. C., 15 N. W. Rep. 526. And
carry it on as the successor of the
the probability that its old customers will continue their custom old firm? This last definition, it is
and commend it to others: Myers
contended, covers every material
point, and does away with a great
v. Kalamazoo Buggy Co., 54 Mich.
deal of the haze which, as we shall
215.
These definitions, .however, are see, still clings around the subject.
only partial. While it is true that
(b). The sources ofgoodwill being
the main business of a firm is so various, it is evident that itmust
securing customers, and then serv- be an open question whether, in a
ing them, it is equally clear that given case, it is an incident of the
the valuable element of the good- trade of the premises on which it
will is that which attracts the cus- is carried on, or of the personnel of
tomers. That is, that in order to
the firm; and that that question
properly define goodwill, we must
can only be settled on the special
go back of the vague generalizing
circumstances of the case. It has
which speaks of it as the probability
been said that the general rule is to
of securing the old customers, and
regard the goodwill as an incident
specify the causes which create
of the premises: Rawson v. Pratt,
that probability. It is true that in
91 Ind. 9; England v. Downs, 6
so doing we are going beyond the Beav. 269; Austen v. Boys, 2 DeG.
proper bounds of a definition, for
& J. 626; S.C., 4 Jur. N. S. 721;
these causes are legion; but noth- Bergamini v. Bastian, 35 La. An.
ing else can give an adequate idea
60; Elliott's App., 6o Pa. 161.
of what goodwill really is. AccordAnd there are many cases in which
ingly, the description given by Mr. this would be true, as in case of a
Justice STOPLY, in his work on Part- tavern or a hotel: Elliott's App.,
nership (7th Ed.), 99, is far presupfra. Or where business and premferable to any of those previously
ises are both leased: Chittenden v.
cited. "This goodwill," he says,
Wiltbeck, 50 Mich. 401 ; S. C., 15
"may be properly enough described
N. V. Rep. 526; Chissum v. Dewes,
to be the advantage orbenefit which
5 Russ. 29; Mitchell v. Reed, i9
is acquired by an establishment
Hun. (N. Y.) 418; S. C., 84 N.
beyond the mere value of the Y. 55 6 . But when the business is
capital stock, funds, or property
carried on independently by the
employed therein, in consequence
firm, and the premises only are
leased, it certainly seems the better
of the general public patronage
and encouragement, which it re- opinion to hold the goodwill an
ceives from constant or habitual
incident of the trade: Succession
customers, on account of its local
of Jean Journ6, 21 La. An. 391.
position or common celebrity, or
A good instance of the absurd rereputation for skill or affluence, or
sults to which the strict application
punctuality, or from other acciof this rule wonld lead, is to be
found in Austin v. Boys, 2 DeG.
dental circumstances or necessities,
or even from ancient partialities or, &J. 626; S. C., 4Jur. N. S. 721,
prejudices."
Yet this, too, is too where it was gravely ruled that
bulky to be of practical use: and
goodwill, being connected with
what more does it amount to than
place, was inapplicable to the busi-

GOODWILL AS

PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.

ness of a solicitor, which has no
local existence, but is purely personal, depending on the trust and
confidence which persons may repose in the integrity and ability of
the solicitor to conduct their legal
affairs. But why should they not
repose the same confidence in his
integrify and ability to select a
proper successor? At any rate, the
validity of the sale of the business
of a professional man (except a
clergyman, who is too apt to have
no good will to dispose of), is too
well settled to be called in ques-.
tion; and nothing but the goodwill can pass by such a sale, unless
we are to assume that the vendee
was too innocent to know that he
pays an exorbitant sum for the
mere material subjects of the
contract.
Goodwill, then, does not necessarily depend exclusively
on
locality, it may also depend, to
some extent, on the personal qualities of the proprietor of the business; and though this is a matter
very difficult to transfer, there
seems to be no doubt that it can be
done, figuratively at least, in such a
way that the vendee can reap some
benefit from it; and that is all that
any sale of goodwill amounts to. It
- is equally clear that it may depend
upon the nature of the trade, in
certain instances, as where certain
patents are owned by the firm, or
it has the reputation of making a
certain brand of goods; and this is
especially true in modern times,
when goods are sent to such distances for sale. It makes no difference to the man who wants a Winchester rifle, a Remington typewriter, or a Disston saw, whether
those articles are made in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, or Patagonia. What difference, then, could

locality make if the right to make
and sell those goods were to be
sold ?
(c). But whether dependent on
person, trade, or place, the goodwill of a business is a valuable
property right: Potter v. Comrs.,
io Exch. 147; Senter v. Davis, 38
Cal. 450. It is part of the assets
of a business: Wallingford v. Burr,
17 Neb. 137. It is part of the assets
of a decedent: Succession of jean
Journ6. 21 La. An. 391, 'and must
be accounted for by his personal
representative. If an executor con'ducts the business as his'own, he is
chargeable with the value of the
goodwill; but that goodwill does
not include the right to use the
name of the decedent: Randell's
Est., 8 N. Y., Suppl. 652. It is
equally a part of partnership.
property: Bell v. llis, 33 Cal. 620.
Goodwill may be the subject of a
contract of sale : Carruthers v.
McMurray, 75 Iowa, 173, but only
in connection with the business, of
which it is an incident. It cannot
be sold apart from that business,
either by judicial sale, or otherwise.
A mortgage of the "machinery,
type, presses, cases, furniture,
paper, forms and tools of a newspaper company, together with the
goodwill" of its business, cannot.
be foreclosed as to the goodwill,
after all the tangible property
covered by did mortgage has been
alienated, worn out, or destroyed,
and the corporation has becomeconsolidated with another newspaper corporation: Met. Natl. Bk.
v. St. L. Dispatch Co., 36 Fed. Rep.
722.

. A misrepresentation in regard to
the goodwill of a business is, when
the two are sold together, material
and fraudulent: Cruess v. Fessler,
39 Cal. 336. And when the con-
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tract for the sale of the stock and
goodwill of a business is an entirety,
the vendor cannot relieve himself
from liability for fraud in respect
to the goodwill by proving the
stock to be worth the full amount
paid: Herfort v. Cramer, 7 Colo.
483.
If the right conveyed by a sale
of the goodwill of a business be
unlawfully taken away and destroyed, the law will award a compensation, as in case of injury to
any other right; and this rule is
applicable to the issuing of an
attachment on the stock in trade in
a case growing out of the sale of
stock and goodwill, whereby customers were kept away : Carey v.
Gunnison (Iowa), 17 N. W. Rep.
881.
One who has paid for the goodwill of a business cannot recover
the price paid on the ground that
the goodwill was not vendible:
Buckingham v. Waters, I4 Cal. 146.
As goodwill can be sold, it can
also be mortgaged, assigned, or
taken in execution, in connection,
of course, with the business to
which it is incident: Met. Nat'l
Bk. v. St. L. Dispatch Co., 36 Fed.
Rep. 722; Potter v. Comrs., 1o
Exch. 147; Walker v. Mottram, i9
Ch. D. 355; Hudson v. Osborne,
39 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 79. But not if
dependent solely upon the personal
skill of the proprietor: Cooper v.
Met. Board of Works, 25 Ch. D.
472.
II. Sale of Goodwill-As the
sale of the goodwill of a business
practically amounts to giving up to
the vendee the right of the old firm
to deal as such with its .old customers, and whatever new ones
may be attracted by its special
advantages, the only tangible right
that the vendee acquires is that of

holding himself out as the successor of the old finn; and to that
extent only, it would seem, the
law, in the absence of special circumstances, will protecthim. This
is what seems to be meant by the
expression in Bradford z,. Peckham,
9 R. I. 250, that goodwill is the
goodwill as the vendor used it, and
only coextensive with the business
carried on. Accordingly, the sale
of a trade or business, with the
goodwill, does not prevent the
vendor from setting up again in a
similar trade or business, without
an express covenant, or fraud in inducing the vendee or others to believe that he would not engage in
the same again, or the like: Cruttwell v. Lye, 17 Ves. 335; Shackle
v. Baker, 14 Ves. 468; Churton v.
Douglas, i Johns. (Eng.) Ch. 174;
Davies v. Hodgson, 25 Beav. 177;
Bergamini v. Bastian, 35 La. An.
6o; Bassett v. Percival, 5 Allen
(Mass.), 345 ; Hoxie v. Chaney, 143
Mass. 592; Rupp v. Over, 3
Brewst. (Pa.) 133; Moreau v.
Edwards, 2 Tenn., Ch. 347; Washburn v. Dorsch (Wis.), 32 N. W.
Rep. 551 But though the sale of
goodwill does not take away the
vendor's right to engage in the
same business again, it does preclude him from interfering actively
with the benefits and advantages of
the business sold; and he therefore
has no right to hold himself out as
the successor of the old firm, or as
continuing its business: Hudson v.
Osborne, 39 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 79;
Dwight v. Hamilton, r13 Mass. 175;
Smith v. Gibbs, 44 N. H. 335;
Hall's App., 60 Pa. 458.
Nor
(though there is some difference of
opinion on this question), has he a
right to directly solicit trade from
the customers of the old firm;
although there would seem to be
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no reason against his doing so by
general advertising, and he can certainly deal with them if they come
unsolicited: Giuesi v. Cooper, 14
Ch. D. 596, as modified by Leggott v. Barrett, 15 Ch. D. 306;
S. C., 43 L. T. N. S. 64r; Labouchere v. Dawson, 13 L. R. Eq. 322,
as modified by Walker v. Mottram,
19 Ch. D. 355, and Pearson v. Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145.
The vendor.may, however, bind
himself by express covenant or
agreement not to engage in the
same business again within a certain area or time; and this restriction, if reasonable, will bind him:
Howard v. Taylor, 9° Ala. 241;
Morgan v. Perhamus, 36 Ohio St.
517; Thompson v. Andrews (Mich.),
41 N. W. Rep. 68 3 . But he may
engage in business outside of the
limitation, or at the expiration of
the time, and, it has been held,
may solicit his old customers,
though this hardly seems consonant
with sound reasoning: Hanna v.
Andrews, 50 Iowa, 462.
Conveying, as it dods, the exclusive right of succession to the business of the old firm, the sale of the
goodwill carries with it as incidents
whatever is necessary to effectuate
that right, as the trade-marks and
trade-name of the former firm:
Levy v. Walker, Io Ch. D. 447;
S. C. (C. A.), 48 L. J. Ch. (N. S.)
273; Caswell v. Hazard, 2 N. Y.
Suppl. 783; Drake v. Dodsworth,
4 Kans. i59; contra, Lewis v.
Smith, 8 Pa. C. C. R. 327. This
rule is especially applicable to the
case of a newspaper. "The goodwill of a newspaper establishment
often constitutes its largest value.
A majority of the subscribers are
generally permanent. They become
attached to the paper on account of
its sentiments, whether political,

religious, or literary, and the ability
and energy with which it is conducted. The habit of reading a
particular paper periodically seems
to stimulate a desire for its continuance. Subscribers, once obtained,
are permanent customers, not only
for- the paper, but for advertising
and job work: " Boon v. Moss, 70
N. Y. 465.
The goodwill which merely pertains to the place of business, however (whatever that may be), does
not carry with it the right to use
the firm name: Morgan v. Schuyler,
79 N. Y. 49o . And no sale of goodwill can carry with it the right to
use a firm name, which is the individual name of the vendor, without an express agreement to that
effect: Churton v. Douglas, I Johns.
(Eng.) Ch. 174; Thynne v. Shove,
45 Ch. D. 577; Howe v. Searing,
6 Bosw. (N. Y.) 354; Vonderbank
v. Schmidt (La.), io So. Rep. 6r5.
Yet in such a case the vendor,
though at liberty to engage in business again, as we have seen, may
not use his own name again in such
a way as to lead others to believe
that his is a continuation of the old
business: Churton v. Douglas,
supra.
There is no substantial difference
between a sale of goodwill made by
a trader himself," and a forced sale,
on execution or by an assignee;
and the rules previously laid down'
apply equally to the latter class of
sales: Hudson v. Osborne, 39 L. J.
Ch. (N. S.) 79, with perhaps the
single exception, -4ihich seems to
be founded on a true equity, that a
forced sale will not preclude the
passive vendor from soliciting his
old customers, if he again engage
in business: Walker v. Mottram,
19 Ch. D. 355.
Ithas been ruled that a sale of a
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business, without any mention of
goodwill, dbes not carry the latter;
but that can only be true when
there are circumstances to show
that the assets of the business only
were included in the sale: Hebert
v. Dupaty, 42 La. An. 343; S. C.,
7 So. Rep. 58o; Costello v. Eddy,
12 N. Y. Suppl. 236; S. C. aff.
128 N. Y. 650; 29 N. E. Rep. 146.
The proper presumption would
seem to be that the goodwill is included in the sale, at least, where
the assets are not worth the pice
paid, or where lists of customers
are included: Boon v. Moss, 7o N.
Y. 465. But this reduces it to a
mere question of fact in every case.
III. Goodwill of Partnership
Firms.-The goodwill is an asset
of the partnership: Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, 17 Ves. 298;
Hall v. Barrows, io Jur. (N. S.)
55; Reynolds. v. Bullock, 47 L. J.
Ch. (N. S.) 773; S. C., 26 W. R.
678; Bell v. Ellis, 33 Cal. 620;
Williams v. Wilson, 4 Sandf. Ch.
379; Brass & Iron Works Co. v.
Payne (the principal case), (Ohio)
33 N. E. Rep. 88. In pursuance of
the old notion that partnership was
akin to joint tenancy, it was formerly held in England that it went
to thesurviving partner: Hammond
v. Douglas, 5 Ves. 539; Crawshay'
v. Collins, 15 Ves. 218; Lewis v.
Langdon, 7 Sim. 421. But that
relic of antiquity is now destroyed,
and it is acknowledged everywhere
that it does not survive, but forms
a part of the general assets of the
partnership: Vedderburn v. Wedderburn, 22 Beav. 84; Smith v.
Everett, 27 Beav. 446; Holden v.
McMakin, i Pars. Eq. Cas. 270;
Dougherty v. VanNostrand, i Hoff.
Ch. 68. And if one partner appropriate it on the dissolution of the
firm by death, he will either be en-

joined from so doing, or be made
to account for it: Willett v. Blanford, 1 Hare, 253; Rammelsberg
v. Mitchell, 29 Ohio St. 22. But he
may retain it, upon payment of its
full value: Shepard v. Boggs, 9
9 Neb. 257.
Where the partnership is kept
secret, and the business conducted
in the name of the accounting
partner, there is no goodwill to
account for (which goes to prove
the contention that goodwill depends very little on place) : Smith
v. Wood, 12 N. Y. Suppl. 724. And
the same would seem to be true
where the business expires by its
own limitation, or by agreement,
each partner having the right to
compete for the'business of the old
firm: Hall v. Hall, 2o Beav. 139;
Van Dyke v. Jackson, i B. D.
Smith (N. Y.), 419; Lobeck v. Lee
(Neb.), 55 N. V. Rep. 650; Musselman's App., 62 Pa. 81 ; Rice v.
Angell, 73 Tex. 350; contra, Bininger v. Clark, Io Abb. (N. Y.) Pr.
(N. S.) 264. This rule may be
changed by express agreement between the partners, either in the
articles of partnership, or otherwise: Turner v. Major, 3 Giff. 442.
And there are certain businesses, as
the publication of a newspaper, in
which the goodwill is so important
a factor in the value of the partnership property that the rule would
notjustly apply: Daytonv. Wilkes,
17 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 5o.
As in other cases, the sale of the
interest of one partner in the goodwill of the business to another, does
not prevent the retiring partner
from setting up in the same business; but it does confer on the purchasing partner the exclusive right
to represent himself as the successor of the old firm, and the retiring partner may not lawfully do
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any act tending to mislead others
into the belief that he is such successor, or that the purchasing
partner is not: Smith v. Everett,
27 Beav. .446; Leggott v. Barrett,
15 Ch. D. 306; S. C., 43 L. T.
(N. S.) 641 ; Cottrell v. Babcock
Printing Press Mfg. Co., 54 Conn.
122; White v. Jones, i Abb. (N.
Y.) Pr. (N. S.) 328; Moody v.
Thomas, i Disney (Ohio), 294;
Williams v. Farrand (Mich.), 50 N.
W. Rep. 446; Brass & Iron Works
Co. v. Payne (Ohio) (the principal
case), 33 N. R. Rep. 88. The same
rule holds good as to a surviving
partner: Davies v. Hodgson, 25
Beav. 177; Johnson v. Holliday, 2
DeG. J. & S. 446. But the retiring
partner may bind himself not to
engage in business, or interfere
with the other's trade: Dethlefs v.
Tamsen, 7 Daly (N. Y.), 354;
Hollis v. Shafer (Kans.), 17 Pac.
Rep. 86.
Partners who have sold out their
interest in the goodwill of a business to a co-partner will be restrained from carrying on a rival
establishment under a name so
similar to that of the first as to mislead and draw off business: Myers
v. Kalamazoo Buggy Co., 54 Mich.
215.
So, when two partners had
sold to a third their share of the
property of the partnership, and
their interest in the goodwill of the
business, and had agreed in writing
not to do anything which should- in
any wise impair or injure the said
interest in the goodwill; but thereafter engaged in the same business
and competed with the vendee, but
did not specially solicit trade, it
was held that an injunction would
issue to restrain them from soliciting, doing, or obtaining business
from any "of the customers of the
old firm, and from doing anything
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to impair or injure the said interest
in the goodwill: Angier v. Webber, 14 Allen (Mass.), 21.
But
this is not now law to the extent
indicated; and upon the present
state of authority they could only
be restrained from soliciting the old
customers, or otherwise actively
impairing the value of the goodwill.
On a bill filed by one of the partners to wind up the partnership, a
receiver will be appoinited to carry
on ihe business, if necessary to preserve the goodwill: Marten v'. Van
Schaick, 4 Paige (N. V.), 479.
As a rule, the sale by one partner
to another of all the partnership
property, with the understanding
that the purchasing partner is to
succeed to the business of the old
firm, carries with it the goodwill
as an incident:
Brass & Iron
Works Co. v. Payne (Ohio) (the
principal case), 33 N. R. Rep. 88.
The firm name, being part of the
goodwill, passes by a sale thereof,
and becomes the exclusive property
of the purchasing partner: Burckhardt v. Burckhardt, 42 Ohio St.
474; Brass & Iron Works Co. v.
Payne (Ohio), supra.
These rules do not always hold
good, however, and are largely dependent on circumstances: Reeves
v. Denicke, 12 Abb. (N. Y.), Pr.
(N. S.) 92.; Howe v. Searing, 6
Bosw. (N. t.) 354; S. C., io Abb.
(N. Y. ) Pr. 1"64.
One partner can bind the other
by a sale of the goodwill, as of any
other item of partnership property:
Moreau v. Edwards, 2 Tenn. Ch.
347.
IV. Its Value.-The value of the
goodwill of a business, of course,
cannot be shown with certainty:
Burckhardt v. Burckhardt, 42 Ohio,
St. 474. It is dependent upon the

